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Dysfunctional Institutions, Social Trust, and Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood
Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse
Abstract:
Areas of limited statehood where the state is absent or dysfunctional are rarely ungoverned 
or ungovernable spaces. The provision of rules and regulations as well as of public goods 
and services – governance – does not necessarily depend on the existence of functioning 
state institutions. How can this be explained? This article makes two claims. First, we identify 
functional equivalents to state institutions that fail to govern hierarchically. Second, we focus on 
informal institutions based on social trust that are endogenous to areas of limited statehood. 
Personalized social trust among community members enables actors to overcome collective 
action problems, enhancing the legitimacy of governance actors. The main challenge in areas 
of limited statehood, which are often characterized by social heterogeneity and deep social 
and cultural cleavages (particularly in post-conflict societies), is to move from personalized 
to generalized trust in “imagined communities” despite dysfunctional state institutions. We 
argue that generalized trust in areas of limited statehood crucially depends on inclusive social 
identities as an enabling condition for effective and legitimate governance.
Zusammenfassung:
Räume begrenzter Staatlichkeit, in denen der Staat entweder abwesend oder dysfunktional 
ist, sind selten unregiert oder unregierbar. Die Bereitstellung von Regeln, öffentlichen Gütern 
und Dienstleistungen – Governance – hängt nicht notwendigerweise von funktionierenden 
staatlichen Institutionen ab. Wie kann dies erklärt werden? Der Aufsatz stellt zwei Argumente 
vor. Erstens identifizieren wir funktionale Äquivalente zu staatlichen Institutionen, die nicht 
mehr hierarchisch steuern können. Zweitens fokussieren wir auf informelle Institutionen, 
die auf sozialem Vertrauen beruhen und in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit vorfindbar sind. 
Personalisiertes soziales Vertrauen zwischen Mitgliedern einer Gemeinschaft ermöglicht 
Akteuren, Probleme kollektiven Handelns zu lösen. Außerdem stärkt es die Legitimität 
von Governance-Akteuren. Räume begrenzter Staatlichkeit sind aber häufig durch soziale 
Heterogenität gekennzeichnet und sozial wie kulturell tief zerklüftet (vor allem in Post-
Konflikt-Gesellschaften). Deshalb besteht die zentrale Herausforderung darin, personalisiertes 
in generalisiertes Vertrauen in „imaginierten Gemeinschaften“ zu verwandeln trotz 
dysfunktionaler staatlicher Institutionen. Wir argumentieren, dass generalisiertes Vertrauen 
in Räumen begrenzter Staatlichkeit von inklusiven sozialen Identitäten abhängt als einer 
Erfolgsbedingung für effektive und legitime Governance.
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1. Introduction: Governance despite Dysfunctional States
Dysfunctional state institutions are a common feature in the contemporary international 
system. In fact, most states are dysfunctional in a very basic Weberian sense.1 Max Weber 
conceptualized statehood as an institutionalized structure with the ability to rule authoritatively 
and legitimately control the means of violence (Weber 1921/1980). In other words, the ideal typical 
state commands what Krasner calls “domestic sovereignty,” that is, “the formal organization of 
political authority within the state and the ability of public authorities to exercise effective 
control within the borders of their own polity” (Krasner 1999: 4). If ideal typical statehood is 
about the ability to rule authoritatively and implement and enforce decisions, this capacity 
is lacking for the majority of states in the current international system. In other words, 
dysfunctional statehood is the default in the international system and has been for a long time. 
There are a few completely “failed states,” such as Somalia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
or currently Syria. Most countries, however, exhibit “areas of limited statehood,” that is, parts of 
the territory or policy areas where central state institutions are unable to effectively implement 
and enforce decisions (Risse 2011a). Washington D.C., Berlin, Rio de Janeiro, and Nairobi have 
this in common. While state authorities can effectively enforce the law in some (or most) parts 
of these cities, other parts are beyond their reach.
However, neither Washington nor Berlin, Rio, or Nairobi are ungoverned spaces just because 
the respective state authorities cannot rule parts of their territories. The literature on “failed 
statehood” (see e.g., Rotberg 2003, 2004 2004; Milliken & Krause 2002; Dorff 2005, Piazza 
2008) tends to conflate governance and statehood. For instance, the “fragile states index”2 
which is widely used to determine states at risk, lumps together governance indicators (basic 
infrastructure, economic development, and the like), regime type, and state indicators. As a 
result, it becomes impossible to examine the relationship between statehood and (good) 
governance. Statehood is about the capacity to implement and enforce central decisions 
including maintaining a monopoly on the means of violence (see above). Governance refers to 
institutionalized modes of social coordination to solve collective action problems and provide 
binding rules and regulations, as well as public goods and services (Mayntz 2009; Benz 2004; 
Kooiman 1993; Rhodes 1997). 
We argue in the following that areas of limited statehood where the state is absent or 
dysfunctional are rarely ungoverned or ungovernable spaces. The provision of rules and 
regulations as well as of public goods and services – governance – does not necessarily depend 
on the existence of functioning state institutions (for details and evidence see Krasner & Risse 
2014). Quantitative studies have shown that there is no linear relationship between degrees of 
statehood and effective service provision (Lee et al. 2014). Qualitative studies confirm that there 
is huge variation in the degree to which effective governance can be provided under conditions 
1 This article is based on data and findings from the Collaborative Research Center 700 “Governance in 
Areas of Limited Statehood,” funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG). We thank the DFG 
for its continuous support. 
2 http://ffp.statesindex.org (accessed 16.09.2014).
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of dysfunctional state institutions (for South Africa see e.g., Börzel & Thauer 2013; Hönke 2013; 
for Somalia see Schäferhoff 2014; Menkhaus 2006/2007; see also Beisheim et al. 2014; Risse 2011b; 
Krasner & Risse 2014; Scott 2009). Weak or limited statehood does not necessarily lead to weak 
governance.
But how can we explain the provision of governance despite dysfunctional state institutions? 
This article makes two claims. First, we identify functional equivalents to state institutions 
that fail to govern hierarchically. This part of our contribution summarizes our previous work 
(Börzel & Risse 2010). 
Second, we focus on informal institutions based on social trust that are endogenous to areas 
of limited statehood. We discuss the conditions under which such institutions emerge and are 
likely to contribute to the provision of public goods rather than becoming a public bad that 
breeds clientelism, corruption, and violent conflict. Personalized social trust among community 
members enables actors to overcome collective action problems, enhancing the legitimacy of 
governance actors. Such a “shadow of the community” also holds state authorities and other 
“governors” (Avant et al. 2010) accountable. 
The main challenge in areas of limited statehood, which are often characterized by social 
heterogeneity and deep social and cultural cleavages (particularly in post-conflict societies), is 
to move from personalized to generalized trust in “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991) 
despite dysfunctional state institutions. We argue that generalized trust in areas of limited 
statehood crucially depends on inclusive social identities as an enabling condition for effective 
and legitimate governance.
2. External Statehood as a Functional Equivalent Compensating for Dysfunctional 
Institutions 
Governance is about rule making and the provision of common goods for a collectivity. 
“Governance by the state” is usually provided through hierarchical steering by functioning state 
institutions. Yet, as argued above, state institutions in most parts of the world are dysfunctional 
in the sense that they lack the capacity to set and enforce collectively binding rules and provide 
common goods. Unfortunately, the governance literature is still wedded to consolidated 
statehood. While scholars have recently emphasized non-hierarchical modes of governance that 
also include non-state actors, most studies claim that governance requires at least a “shadow of 
hierarchy” provided by the state in order to be effective (e.g. Scharpf 1997; Héritier & Lehmkuhl 
2008). That is, self-governance and private regulations by non-state actors including companies 
are assumed effective only if the state can credibly threaten to legislate and enforce the rules if 
non-state governance fails.
If this were true, areas of limited statehood would be doomed twice. First, they exhibit 
dysfunctional state institutions that cannot provide public goods. Second, non-hierarchical 
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modes of governance including non-state actors would not be effective, either, since a shadow 
of hierarchy is lacking (Börzel 2010). However, there are plenty examples of effective and 
good governance under conditions of limited statehood. In a previous article (Börzel & Risse 
2010), we theorized about the conditions of effective governance in areas of limited statehood 
with dysfunctional state institutions. We identified functional equivalents to the “shadow of 
hierarchy” cast by effective state institutions. First, the ababsence of state governance provides an 
incentive for other actors, e.g., (trans)national companies and non-governmental organizations, 
to engage in the provision of public goods (shadow of anarchy). Second, external actors, such 
as international organizations or foreign governments, can directly provide public goods. Or 
they substitute for a lacking shadow of hierarchy and commit non-state actors to engage in 
governance (external shadow of hierarchy). Third, social norms may create reputational incentives 
for non-state actors to contribute to governance (shadow of the socially embedded market).3
The literature provides ample evidence for the existence of functional equivalents to effective 
state institutions. Yet, these equivalents still rely at least to some degree on consolidated 
statehood. For instance, the external shadow of hierarchy still requires consolidated statehood. 
External governments use their functioning state institutions to set and enforce (inter)national 
norms and rules for non-state actors operating in areas of limited statehood. Thus, Prakash 
and Potoski have shown that environmental management standards are upheld by companies 
investing in areas of limited statehood that are bound by these rules in their home markets in 
the global North (Prakash & Potoski 2006, 2007).
The shadow of the market can put the non-provision of public goods at a significant competitive 
disadvantage. Yet, such economic incentives depend on the social and regulatory embeddedness 
of markets in which the consumer demand is also influenced by moral obligations. Consumers 
in the domestic markets of the global North require companies to uphold, say, the same 
environmental and human rights (e.g., child labor) standards in areas of limited statehood by 
which they are bound in their Northern home markets. Thus, the regulations of functioning 
state institutions provide for domestic markets where the consumer demand for corporate 
social responsibility translates into competitive (dis)advantages for transnational companies 
investing in the global South.
Overall, the various shadows require at least some degree of consolidated statehood or 
functioning state institutions to deploy their effects in areas of limited statehood. The good 
news is that external statehood is sufficient. Thus, the multi-level nature of governance, linking 
areas of consolidated and limited statehood, provides a functional equivalent to the shadow of 
hierarchy that areas of limited statehood are often unable to generate (Krasner & Risse 2014). 
The international community and/or Western consolidated states use their functional state 
institutions to cast a shadow of hierarchy, causing non-state actors to engage in governance 
and provide public goods in areas of limited statehood. In some cases, these actors – rather 
3 A fourth functional equivalent – the shadow of the community – is endogenous to areas of limited 
state-hood and will be dealt with below.
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than external states or international organizations – even exercise legitimate authority when the 
state is dysfunctional (Koehler & Zürcher 2007). 
Yet, the engagement of international organizations, individual states, non-governmental 
organizations and business in fighting environmental pollution, pandemics, or water shortages 
in areas of limited statehood has been selective at best. So, what about factors endogenous 
to areas of limited statehood that can compensate for dysfunctional state institutions? In the 
following section, we turn to social trust as a major precondition for effective and legitimate 
governance in areas of limited statehood with dysfunctional formal institutions.
3. Social Trust in  Areas of Limited Statehood
What is social trust? Niklas Luhmann has conceptualized trust as “upfront risk-taking” (riskante 
Vorleistung, Luhmann 1989), that is, deliberately abstaining from checking whether one’s 
interaction partner is telling the truth about keeping or not defecting from her commitments. 
As Anthony Giddens put it, trust entails the decision not to insist upon complete information 
(Giddens 1984; see also Hartmann 2011). Andrew Kydd uses game theoretic models to show 
how trust can overcome the security dilemma in international relations. He defines trust as 
“a belief that the other side prefers mutual cooperation to exploiting one’s own cooperation, 
while mistrust is a belief that the other side prefers exploiting one’s cooperation to returning 
it” (Kydd 2005: 6; Hardin 2002: 12). 
The international relations literature on trust is particularly helpful in this context, since 
the “cooperation under anarchy” perspective (Oye 1986) does not assume functioning state 
institutions to enforce rules. Similar arguments have been advanced for local communities and 
society-based networks (Ostrom 1990, 2002, Ostrom et al. 1994; Ellickson 1991; Putnam 1993; 
Hooghe & Stolle 2003). The latter rely on personalized trust among community members who 
trust each other because they know each other, or trust people whom they do not know because 
group members whom they do know (snowballing effect) trust them. In contrast, generalized trust 
reaches “beyond the borders of face-to-face interactions to incorporate people not personally 
known” (Stolle 2002: 397). Generalized trust concerns “imagined communities” (Anderson 1991) 
whose members do not have any personal relationships among each other.
In the following, we first discuss how personalized trust in local communities can overcome 
the governance problem in areas of limited statehood characterized by dysfunctional state 
institutions. We then turn to the more daunting problem of generalized trust in socially 
heterogeneous societies.
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3.1 Personalized Trust in Areas of Limited Statehood
Personalized social trust serves as a functional equivalent for weak or dysfunctional state 
institutions in areas of limited statehood and, thus, helps explain the governance puzzle 
discussed above. It does not necessarily involve external actors but is rather endogenous to local 
communities and society-based networks.4 Personalized social trust contributes to the effective 
provision of governance in the absence of functioning state institutions in at least three ways.
First, social trust enables actors to solve collective action problems in the first place (Rothstein 
2000; Fukuyama 1995; Gambetta 1988). As Fritz Scharpf has argued, trust generates the expectation 
that information about actors’ preferences are communicated truthfully and that commitments 
are complied with (Scharpf 1997, 137). Social trust enables expectations of diffuse reciprocity and 
future cooperation and, thus, facilitates the making of credible commitments. Robert Axelrod 
and Andrew Kydd have used game theoretic models to show how trust stabilizes cooperation 
(Axelrod 1984; Kydd 2005; cf. also Hardin 1982, Hardin 2002). Elinor Ostrom has demonstrated 
through experimental designs that local communities where members trust each other are 
likely to produce common pool resources without having to refer to strong institutions with 
their monitoring and sanctioning mechanisms (Ostrom 1990, 2002, Ostrom et al. 1994). The 
literature on social capital focuses on collective action by communities to provide governance 
themselves rather than rely on other actors and induce them to govern (Boix & Posner 1998). 
Society-based networks or social capital provide an alternative to the provision of public goods 
by the state (cf. Putnam 1993; Ellickson 1991). They operate based on social trust that fosters the 
willingness to cooperate and engage in the provision of common goods. Personalized social 
trust thus enhances the action capacity of local communities. The study of Esther Thomas on 
conflicts between multinational mining companies and neighboring communities in Tanzania 
and Guinea demonstrates that local communities with high levels of social trust have a higher 
capacity to engage with companies in order to manage conflicts (Thomas 2014).
Second, personalized social trust enhances the legitimacy of governance actors. Communities 
whose members trust each other are likely to put leaders in charge and convey authority and 
rules to people whom they also trust (Schatzberg 2001; Paller 2014). Trust generates legitimacy, 
thereby inducing voluntary compliance with costly decisions – again in the absence of formal 
institutions with sanctioning and enforcement capacities. Our research indicates that legitimacy 
is a necessary condition for effective governance in areas of limited statehood (Krasner & Risse 
2014). Without legitimacy, governance in areas of limited statehood (and beyond) tends to be 
ineffective in the provision of collective goods. Social trust is one mechanism through which 
legitimacy is generated (the others being input and output legitimacy, see again Scharpf 1999). In 
this context, Schäferhoff has shown that trust among Somali indigenous communities provided 
them with the capacity to act in the fight against HIV/AIDS and to accept foreign assistance as 
4 This is not to say that external governance providers in areas of limited statehood do not require the 
trust of local communities – on the contrary. Since legitimacy is a necessary condition for the effective 
provision of common goods and services in areas of limited statehood, trust in external actors is a 
powerful source of (empirical) legitimacy (Krasner & Risse 2014; Hölck 2012).
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legitimate in the provinces of Somaliland and Puntland despite the complete absence of central 
state authorities (Schäferhoff 2013, 2014; see also Debiel et al. 2010; Beisheim & Liese 2014). Hölck 
has demonstrated that Spanish colonial rule in Sonora (Mexico) and Araukania (Southern Chile) 
was only effective to the extent that personal trust relationships developed between colonial 
authorities and indigenous communities (Hölck 2012; see also Rinke et al. 2011). 
Third, social trust among community members with their own standards of appropriate 
behavior holds state authorities accountable to the community. Areas of limited statehood 
are often populated by traditional communities with their own standards of what should be 
considered in the public interest – although state actors might not reflect and uphold such 
standards, and these standards do not always fully conform to global standards of human rights, 
democracy, and good governance. Using comparative case studies of public goods provision 
in rural China, Lily Tsai has shown that state representatives embedded in inclusive societal 
institutions at the local level are more likely to strive for public goods provision than those 
who are not embedded or who are working in areas with no inclusive societal institutions 
(Tsai 2007). Likewise, Hönke and Börzel have found that local communities in Sub-Saharan 
Africa exhibiting high levels of social trust restrain local state representatives and customary 
authorities in the use of their powers (Hönke & Börzel 2014). This “shadow of the community” 
holds state representatives accountable in the absence of formal institutions through which 
citizens can voice their claims. Community institutions affect the willingness of state or non-
state actors external to the community to engage in governance. 
Fourth, and related to the third point, this “shadow of the community” based on mutual respect 
and shared norms tends to exhibit strong monitoring and sanctioning capacities that ensure 
compliance with costly rules. The quest for social approval and the threat of social exclusion 
from the community serve as a powerful incentive to comply with the rules and to provide public 
goods. One should not underestimate the sanctioning potential of these informal institutions, 
ranging from social ostracism to physical punishment (Hönke & Börzel 2014; Paller 2014).
Thus, the presence or absence of personalized social trust in local communities offers a 
powerful explanation for the variation in effective governance in areas of limited statehood. 
Yet, two issues remain. First, social trust in local communities is not geared per se toward 
governance in terms of providing binding rules and public goods and services. Clientelistic 
networks also rely on high levels of social trust, but provide exclusionary club goods for their 
clientel. Mancur Olsen has argued that closely knit social, economic, or political organizations 
are prone to act as special rather than public interest groups and engage in rent seeking and 
corruption (Olson 1982). Moreover, in many areas of limited statehood with dysfunctional state 
institutions, those occupying state positions use their power for racketeering and private rent 
seeking while enjoying the full trust of their clientelistic networks so long as their followers 
continue to “eat” (Schatzberg 2001; Bayart 1993). Finally, criminal or terrorist networks, such as 
the mafia, Hamas, or Hezbollah, are built on relationships of trust, too (Stolle & Rochon 1998; 
Portes 1998: 15-18). 
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The literature on social capital is only partially helpful in explaining when society-based 
networks or local communities develop the necessary social trust to make governance without 
functioning state institutions work. It argues that trust is built in voluntary associations and 
social networks of civic engagement, which socialize their members into norms of diffuse 
reciprocity, breed a sense of shared responsibility, and make them trust each other (Putnam 
1993, Putnam 2000; Hooghe & Stolle 2003). Yet, even if this claim holds true,5 such civil society 
organizations and networks have to form in the first place. If they are willing to engage, non-
state actors have to have the necessary autonomy to act free from political control (cf. Mayntz 
1993). Semi-authoritarian and authoritarian regimes tend to suppress the political organization 
of societal or community interests. Moreover, local authorities in areas of limited statehood 
often have sufficient power to prevent collective self-organization, e.g. if it threatens their rent 
seeking opportunities (Börzel et al. 2012). In other words, local self-organization in areas of 
limited statehood seems to require some degree of participatory rule or at least non-interference 
with local community building. Interestingly enough, though, it might be precisely the absence 
of functioning state institutions that fosters community self-organization. Weak states are 
often usurped by rent seeking and clientelistic networks that capture what remains of the state 
and try to exploit the institutions for private gains. As James Scott has argued, self-organization 
among local communities is particularly likely in stateless societies precisely because of the 
absence of predatory, rent seeking, or repressive state institutions (Scott 2009). 
Second, collective goods provision requires governance beyond local communities and society-
based networks where people know each other. Their resources are often too limited to provide 
complex public goods and services, such as health, education, and infrastructure. Many common 
goods problems, such as environmental pollution or pandemics, have to be addressed on a larger 
scale. The scaling-up of governance has been a major driver for building state and international 
institutions (Ostrom 1990; Keohane & Ostrom 1995). State or non-state, the formation of such 
institutions in itself constitutes a collective action problem, whose solution requires trust. 
Cooperation and collective action, particularly in complex diversified societies, requires social 
trust that is generalized (Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 1993; Putnam 2000; Delhey & Newton 2005). 
This is a major challenge for areas of limited statehood.
3.2 Generalized Trust in Areas of Limited Statehood
Developing generalized trust as a precondition for the scaling-up of governance in the absence 
of functional and effective state institutions presents a major challenge for areas of limited 
statehood. Generalized trust is most unlikely to emerge where it is probably needed most, 
namely in post-conflict societies with weak institutional capacities. These societies have suffered 
through decades of communal warfare, ethno-nationalist conflicts, and the like, and are very 
5 The social capital literature finds a correlation between membership in social communities and trust 
(Knack & Keefer 1997; Putnam 1993). However, studies point to endogeneity problems or omitted varia-
ble biases that cast some serious doubts about the existence of a causal relationship (Uslaner 1999; 
Uslaner & Conley 2003; Whiteley 1999; Stolle 2002; Knack 2003; Hooghe 2003; Delhey & Newton 2005).
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unlikely to generate trust among their members. Essentialized ethnic or faith-based identities 
may generate social trust within communities – at best what Putnam calls “bonding social 
capital,” which is inward looking and “reinforces exclusive identities and homogeneous groups” 
(Putnam 2000: 22). It enables groups to cooperate more effectively, albeit to the detriment of 
the wider society (Putnam 1995: 665). At worst, bonding social capital results in strong social 
mistrust and hatred among communities. Or, to put it differently, personalized social trust 
among ethnic or faith-based communities might prevent rather than foster generalized trust 
across diverse communities. 
This consideration results in a paradox for governance in areas of limited statehood, where 
formal institutions are weak and social heterogeneity is high. The greater the ethnic, cultural, 
political, and economic diversity, the greater the need for bridging social capital or generalized 
trust to make governance work. At the same time, diversity has been found to undermine the 
formation of generalized trust and civic engagement (Alesina & La Ferrara 2002; Rice & Steele 
2001; Costa & Kahn 2003; Knack 2003; Delhey & Newton 2005; Putnam 1993). Is there a way out?
The social capital literature has identified several mechanisms through which personalized 
trust can become generalized. First, generalized trust can emerge through the positive 
experience of acting under the assumption that the other will reciprocate instead of defect. 
Such rational learning can evolve through tit-for-tat strategies (Axelrod 1984), a form of specific 
reciprocity combined with the expectation of repeated interaction. Repeated acts of specific 
reciprocity generate sufficient information on actors’ preferences to support the expectation of 
future cooperation, particularly if these acts involve sending costly signals designed to achieve 
reassurance (Kydd 2000; Kahan 2003). Generalized trust promotes reciprocity and cooperation 
beyond tit-for-tat schemes (Whiteley 1999); information about specific actors’ motivations and 
strategies may be generalized to others (Hardin 2002). In principle, this mechanism does not 
require a preexisting institutional framework and is therefore suitable for areas of limited 
statehood.
Second, society-centered approaches to social capital emphasize regular social interaction in 
voluntary associations and social networks of civic engagement through which people learn 
trust, reciprocity, and cooperation. Some also claim that generalized trust depends on cultural 
norms and values, such as optimism, egalitarianism, or Protestantism, in which people become 
socialized (Banfield 1958; Yamagishi & Yamagishi 1994; Uslaner 2002; Delhey et al. 2011). The 
formation of such norms and values, however, is a long-term process “anchored in historical 
and cultural experiences that can be traced over centuries” (Stolle 2002: 404; Putnam 1993). 
Whether this mechanism is available in areas of limited statehood depends on the longue durée 
of community building and the respective historical memories of, for example, indigenous 
communities (Scott 2009; Hölck 2012; Thomas 2014). However, this mechanism of generalized 
trust building is likely to depend on socially and culturally homogenous communities, which 
we rarely find in areas of limited statehood.
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Third, in places where voluntary associations, networks of civic engagement, or historical 
legacies of community building are absent, social capital formation has to rely on formal 
political and legal institutions (Braithwaite & Levi 1998; Levi & Stoker 2000; Hartmann 2011; 
Rothstein & Stolle 2008; Herreros 2012). Social trust emerges from political trust in institutions, 
which are perceived as efficient, fair, and just (Knight 2001; Freitag & Bühlmann 2009). Even if 
functional (state) institutions bring generalized “trust from above” (Fukuyama 2000: 242), they 
are almost by definition absent in areas of limited statehood.6 Dysfunctional state institutions, 
if they exist at all, are unlikely to generate trust precisely because the state is unable to effectively 
implement and enforce decisions. Instead, as mentioned above, we often find strong informal 
institutions in areas of limited statehood through religious or tribal communities based on 
shared normative beliefs and practices. Identification and categorization is a way of generalizing 
trust (Fukuyama 2000; Newton 1999). People trust strangers because they are members of the 
same social group based on kinship, a shared ethnic background, faith, values, common history 
or language, geographical proximity, or behavioral similarities (Brewer 1981; Tanis & Postmes 
2005). On the one hand, these “imagined communities” no longer rely on personalized trust and 
can encompass transnational bonds among millions and billions of people (e.g., the Catholic 
Church as a global transnational community). On the other hand, these forms of generalized 
trust have their limits, since they are based on shared identities and similarities with regard 
to ethnicity, religion, and the like. They do not include people who do not belong to the social 
group or category that the members are part of or feel close to (Stolle 2002). “Groups segregated 
by class, occupation or ethnicity may build cooperation and trust only among group members, 
perhaps even encouraging distrust between members and non-members” (Knack 2003: 343; 
Stolle & Rochon 1998). In-group trust or bonding social capital can ensure the survival of a 
group or community; it also fosters in-group favoritism (Hammond & Axelrod 2006). However, 
the provision of public goods requires generalized trust or bridging social capital which 
“encompasses people across diverse social cleavages” (Putnam 2000: 22; Uslaner & Conley 2003). 
At this point, we are back at square one. How is generalized trust possible in areas of limited 
statehood characterized by social and cultural heterogeneity and strong cleavages? We argue 
that the nature of group identity is pivotal. The inclusiveness of group identities is an important 
scope condition under which social trust in local communities and society-based networks 
becomes generalized, promoting the provision of public goods rather than undermining it 
by fostering clientelism and conflict. According to Social Identity Theory, people that share a 
strong sense of group identity cooperate more within their group but less with outsiders (Tajfel 
1945). Yet, group identities can be more or less inclusive and accommodating to strangers. 
The more inclusive a group identity is, the more easily it can be extended to encompass other 
groups.7 Moreover, self-categorization theory tells us that individuals naturally identify with 
6 The question remains whether institution-based approaches to social capital actually rely on social 
trust in the Luhmannian sense of “upfront risk-taking“ (see above) or rather on confidence in effective 
institutions and their enforcement capacities (on the difference between trust and confidence see 
Luhmann 2000).
7 Another scope condition identified by the literature is more applicable to consolidated statehood, 
namely formal institutions (e.g. group rights, power sharing arrangements) by which societies manage 
diversity (Hooghe 2007; Freitag & Bühlmann 2009).
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several social groups holding multiple identities (Turner 1987; Abrams & Hogg 1990). These 
identity categories can then be nested or blended into each other (I can identify with my village, 
my district, and my nation); they can also intersect or overlap each other (e.g. gender identities 
and ethnic identifications; see Brewer 2001; Herrmann & Brewer 2004).
In this context, Shmuel Eisenstadt and Bernd Giesen distinguish between three types of social 
identities, namely primordial, sacred, and civic (Eisenstadt & Giesen 1995). Civic identities are 
the most inclusive and tolerant toward the “out-group” and do not treat one’s own community 
as particularly special. Rather, relationships to other communities are characterized by mutual 
respect. As a consequence, social trust among members is likely conducive to governance and 
the provision of public goods. 
At the other end of the spectrum are primordial identities. Not only do community members 
perceive themselves as very special, but the various “out-groups” are also regarded as inferior—
and the “others” have no way to become members of the “in-group.” Essentialized ethnic 
identities often have primordial characteristics.8 It follows that social trust among community 
members with primordial group identities is unlikely to contribute to public goods provision 
outside the group. Rather, social trust is likely to further the provision of exclusionary club 
goods as is common within clientelistic networks.
In between these two extremes are so-called “sacred” identity constructions. While the “in-group” 
is considered superior and the “out-group” is looked down upon, “out-group” members can 
convert and be integrated into the community. It is no coincidence that religious communities 
often exhibit such “sacred identities.” Since they regard members of other (religious) 
communities as potential converts, some degree of religious tolerance is at least a possibility. As 
a result, trust can be built between communities, and governance and public service provision 
becomes possible. The latter then depends entirely on the community’s own beliefs about the 
“in-group’s” degree of “sacredness.” It is not by chance that we often find religious communities 
providing public goods and services and, thus, governing areas of limited statehood. 
To sum up, social heterogeneity impedes the formation of social trust within local communities 
and society-based networks. Once in-group trust is built, however, it makes the generalization 
of social trust more likely when combined with an inclusive civic or at least sacred identity, 
which allows for the emergence of multiple, overlapping communities. “The more identity-
categories overlap in the positive cooperation experience, the easier the transfer of trust to 
society at large” (Stolle 2002: 405). Cleavages cutting across multiple categories can moderate 
the harmful effect of social fragmentation (Buzasi 2014; Dunning & Harrison 2010; cf. Coser 
1956). Overlapping identities are not the same as a global identity or an identity based on 
universal values, which might be too general to generate sufficient generalized trust (Brewer 
1981). Rather, the “nesting” or “layering” of identities (Risse 2010) allows people to broaden their 
8 Note that primordial identities are still social constructions, but they are constructed in an essentialized 
way.
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belief in the trustworthiness of known persons to also encompass strangers (Stolle 2002). It is 
therefore crucial in socially and culturally heterogeneous areas of limited statehood to construct 
overlapping identities that allow for “communities among strangers” (Habermas 1996). The 
good news is that ethnic or religious identities do not have to be primordial; they can be civic 
or sacred, allowing for generalized trust among socially diverse groups as a crucial precondition 
for the provision of collective goods in areas of limited statehood in the absence of functioning 
state institutions. The bad news is that all too often political and social elites construct such 
identities in primordial ways for power-political purposes (Fearon & Laitin 2000).
4. Conclusion
Our starting point in this essay was the empirical observation that states with dysfunctional 
and ineffective institutions are neither ungoverned nor ungovernable. Rather, we observe huge 
variations with regard to the provision of public goods and compliance with costly rules in areas 
of limited statehood. How can this be explained? We have argued previously (Börzel & Risse 
2010) that “governance without the state” often relies on functional equivalents for the shadow 
of hierarchy in order to be effective. However, many of these mechanisms ultimately depend 
on effective institutions in consolidated states (mostly in the global North). In this article, we 
focused on a particular endogenous mechanism to ensure effective and “good” governance in 
areas of limited statehood, namely social trust defined as “upfront risk-taking” (Luhmann). 
Social trust helps to overcome collective action problems, stabilize cooperation in the absence 
of effective formal institutions, and enhance the legitimacy of rulers. We then distinguished 
between personalized and generalized trust, the latter referring to social trust in “imagined 
communities among strangers.”
Explaining the transformation from personalized to generalized trust presents a particular 
puzzle under conditions of limited and dysfunctional statehood, where formal (state) institutions 
are by definition weak or absent. Society-based approaches to social capital identify regular 
social interaction in voluntary associations and society-based networks as a way to broaden 
trust relations. However, society-driven trust building is most likely to emerge in homogeneous 
groups. While those may exist in areas of limited statehood at the local level, the provision of 
public goods requires generalized trust, which is hard to generate precisely when groups are 
tightly knit. They tend to feature high levels of social trust within the group or community but 
are prone to clientelism, rent seeking, corruption, and often distrust and hostility toward other 
groups and communities.
We have argued that the paradox of diversity and trust is mitigated by inclusive identities that 
accommodate membership in different groups. Overlapping group memberships are a way to 
generalize trust that relies on neither functional (state) institutions nor voluntary associations 
or networks of civic engagement but can rather involve families, neighborhoods, school- or 
work-related groups, and religious communities – as long as they are not based on primordial 
identities.
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In sum, dysfunctional institutions – limited statehood in our case – are not the end of governance. 
Most people in the world have to cope with inefficient and ineffective state institutions in areas 
of limited statehood. However, some of these areas are reasonably well governed. Our task as 
researchers is to explore when and how collective action emerges in the absence of effective 
formal (state) institutions rather than engaging in fruitless attempts at state and nation building. 
Generalized trust enabling the provision of collective goods and governance can emerge even in 
dysfunctional states, resulting from inclusive group identities in communities of overlapping 
memberships.
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